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 Unnatural Disaster: Social Impacts and Policy 
Choices after Katrina  
John R. Logan 
Early media reports about the wind damage and flooding caused by Hurricane 
Katrina have been focused on New Orleans, and especially on the people who had 
been unable to escape the city before it flooded. Images of poor and predominantly 
black people crowded into the Superdome and Convention Center created indelible 
impressions about who was affected most strongly. We now know that most 
residents had evacuated safely and that even some mostly white and predominantly 
middle class neighborhoods were decimated by the flooding. And yet the initial 
impression is true: Katrina disproportionately affected poor, black neighborhoods. 
Because these are the residents with the least market resources, this means that 
policy choices affecting who can return, to which neighborhoods, and with what 
forms of public and private assistance, will greatly affect the future character of the 
city. 
At this writing, more than a year after the hurricane, what stands out is the fail-
ure to formulate a coherent policy. But what is visible so far is disturbing. It now 
appears that the recovery of New Orleans will be unusually slow. A reliable estimate 
of the city’s population prepared by the Louisiana Department of Health and Hos-
pitals (2006) estimated a total of 201,000 persons, far less than half the 494,000 
counted by Census 2000. The white population in the period June-October was 
about two thirds of its former size, while the black population was down by nearly 
three quarters. Several questions will be addressed here to understand this result and 
interpret its future implications: 1. who was displaced by Katrina, 2. how does the 
pattern of displacement affect people’s chances of returning, 3. how are public 
policy decisions affecting the recovery process, and 4. what do shifts in local politi-
cal influence portend for the future? 
Displacement from New Orleans 
The best information about displacement, including the neighborhood location and 
social composition of affected people, is based on counts of the population living in 
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areas that were flooded. My estimate is that nearly 650,000 persons lived in heavily 
damaged areas in the New Orleans metropolitan region and Mississippi Coast 
(Logan 2006a). More than half of these, 354,000, lived in the city proper, Orleans 
Parish (for a similar conclusion, see the report by the Congressional Research Ser-
vice: Gabe et al 2005). 
Figure 1: Extent of flood damage from Katrina and racial composition of census tracts in New 
Orleans. 
 
Figure 1 shows flooded and non-flooded areas of Orleans Parish along with the 
racial composition (per cent black) of Census tracts. This map shows that the unda-
maged areas of the city were mainly in two areas. One is just north of the Mississip-
pi River in a zone extending westward from downtown. The other is across the 
river on the West Bank, in a district known as Algiers. The map shows that some 
predominantly white neighborhoods in the northwest part of the city were entirely 
flooded. However almost all of the neighborhoods that were in the range of 75 per 
cent to 100 per cent black at the time of Census 2000 were flooded. I estimate that 
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about 265,000 of the city’s Census 2000 black population of 325,000 lived in 
flooded zones. This compares to about 68,000 of 129,000 non-blacks. 
Separate analyses demonstrate that damaged areas were also disproportionately 
composed of renters and lower income residents. However it is the division by race 
that stands out most strongly, because the most damaged black neighborhoods had 
varying class composition, ranging from predominantly middle class New Orleans 
East to the much less affluent Lower Ninth Ward, to neighborhoods with public 
housing projects where a majority of residents were below the poverty line. 
Discussions of the racially differential impact of Katrina have often emphasized 
the Lower Ninth Ward (where many homes were entirely demolished by the breach 
in the levee of the Industrial Canal) and New Orleans East. Most neighborhoods in 
these planning districts were more than 85 per cent black, and most residences were 
damaged. A majority of residents of both of these planning districts were homeow-
ners, though there were clear class distinctions between the two areas. More than a 
third of Lower Ninth Ward residents were below the poverty line, and nearly 14 per 
cent were unemployed. New Orleans East had a considerably larger middle class 
component, though it was not among the city’s most affluent sections. 
Many of the most segregated neighborhoods with the highest poverty rates are 
those identified as »projects« a reference to the prominence of public housing 
within their borders. The project neighborhoods typically had poverty rates in the 
range of 60–80 per cent of the population, unemployment is above 20 per cent, 
they were all predominantly black (with African Americans accounting for 90 per 
cent or more of their residents), and 80 per cent or more of residents were renters. 
There are six such neighborhoods in New Orleans (though there are concentrations 
of public housing or Section 8 housing in other parts of the city). In five of them 
with a combined 2000 population of over 15,000 persons (Calliope, Iberville, St. 
Bernard Area, Desire, and Florida) the entire territory was damaged. 
At the other end of the class spectrum are a number of more advantaged 
neighborhoods with poverty rates below 10 per cent or unemployment rates below 
5 per cent. In the most heavily impacted planning districts, only a few neighbor-
hoods meet either criterion. These include the Lake-Terrace/Lake Oaks neighbor-
hood in Gentilly and the Read Boulevard East neighborhood in New Orleans East. 
Most such neighborhoods are in the Lakeview Planning District, which is an area 
with a small black population, mostly homeowners, and very low rates of poverty 
and unemployment. Here only the Lakeshore/Lake Vista neighborhood, adjacent to 
Lake Pontchartrain, was partly spared. 
Few residents in the French Quarter, a predominantly white neighborhood with 
a poverty rate of about 11 per cent and unemployment below 5 per cent, lived in 
tracts that were flooded. Among other neighborhoods with a national reputation for 
affluence, the Garden District neighborhood was not flooded and only 40 per cent 
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of the Audubon/University neighborhood (home of Tulane University and Loyola 
University) was damaged.  
Where people went 
The Census data represent the numbers of persons who were at greatest risk of 
being displaced for more than a few weeks. What is known about the actual long-
term displacement of population? Evidence is given here from three different sour-
ces. Each source has its own limitations, but taken together these sources offer a 
consistent picture: the majority of the city’s population is still living elsewhere, of 
these the largest share is living outside the state, and black residents (especially poor 
black residents) are disproportionately found at the greatest distance from their 
prior homes. 
One source is postal change of address data in the post-Katrina period, tabu-
lated by the U.S. Postal Service (Russell 2006). These data identify the original pre-
Katrina 3-digit zip code (origin) and current 3-digit zip code (destination) of house-
holds that filed changes of address. At the end of March 2006 more than 160,000 
households were relocated from their original address in Orleans Parish. Of these, 
about 17,000 were at a new address within Orleans Parish. About 21,000 were else-
where in the metropolitan region, plus 15,000 in Baton Rouge, and 12,000 in other 
parts of Louisiana. Close to two-thirds were out-of-state, most prominently in 
Texas (52,000). The most common out-of-state destinations were Houston 
(27,000), Dallas (14,000), and Atlanta (8,000). 
Another source is FEMA’s tally of the reported addresses of area residents who 
had applied for assistance. This information was prepared in mid-February 2006 
and made available in the federal court case that challenged election procedures 
(Wallace v. Blanco). An astounding total of nearly 400,000 persons initially living in 
Orleans Parish had applied for assistance. Of these, 154,000 were living within 
Louisiana, including a number of persons who had suffered relatively minor damage 
and returned to their original homes. But over 100,000 reported addresses in Texas 
and an even larger number were living in other states. These numbers reinforce the 
conclusion above about the significance of displacement outside of Louisiana, 
especially to Texas.  
The impacts of displacement depend not only on its volume but also its location – 
and the furthest away turn out to be African Americans, especially those with the 
lowest incomes. The only public source of information about the racial composition 
and income levels of displaced persons is the Current Population Survey (CPS), 
conducted by the U.S. Department of Commerce. CPS is collected monthly for a 
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national sample of 60,000 households. It is designed to be representative of the civi-
lian non-institutional population age 16 and above. Beginning in November 2005 
CPS included a question to identify persons who were evacuated as a result of Hur-
ricanes Katrina and Rita. Its principal limitations are its relatively small sample size 
and its exclusion of persons living in shelters, hotels, or other forms of group quar-
ters. The sample weights provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics allow the sam-
ple to be used to produce population estimates, and I have used the sample data 
from December 2005 to evaluate the racial composition and income levels of dis-
placed persons (Logan 2006b). I selected only persons whose original pre-Katrina 
residence was in the State of Louisiana. I focused on non-Hispanic whites and non-
Hispanic blacks. The number of evacuees identified as Hispanic, Asian, or other 
race is too small to permit analysis. 
In December 2005, evacuees identified in CPS-sampled households represented 
about 1.1 million persons aged 16 and over who had evacuated from where they 
were living in August. Just over half of these persons had returned to the home 
from which they had evacuated. According to this source, more than 400,000 whites 
were evacuated, of whom 67 per cent had returned home. Among blacks, more 
than 200,000 were evacuated, of whom less than 40 per cent had returned home. Of 
those who were still displaced, nearly two-thirds of whites were in Louisiana, while 
three-quarters of blacks were out of state. 
It is also relevant to compare the income levels of white and black evacuees. 
White evacuees had similar income levels regardless of their current location, with a 
median just under 50,000 US Dollars and less than 15 per cent in households with 
income under 20,000 US Dollars. Black evacuees who had returned home had 
somewhat lower incomes than whites. Blacks who remained displaced had much 
lower incomes, with a median of under 15,000 US Dollars and more than 60 per 
cent below 20,000 US Dollars. It is clear, therefore, that blacks – because they were 
further away and had fewer personal resources – faced great obstacles to their 
return to New Orleans. 
Policy choices 
The sheer number of people who lived in heavily damaged areas is a reminder of 
the scale of Katrina’s impact. Because the storm hit large numbers of people of 
every race and class, it is not surprising that initial public support for policies to 
assist these people also cut across race and class lines. However there was also a 
substantial disproportionate impact on African Americans and people with fewer 
resources. These disparities stem from within the City of New Orleans itself, and 
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more specifically from vulnerability to flooding. This is a pattern with deep roots, 
and although Katrina caused the most extensive flooding in memory, prior studies 
by historians (such as Colten 2005) have demonstrated that both high ground and 
public investments in drainage and pumping systems consistently worked to the 
advantage of certain neighborhoods in past storms. 
There are major variations across the region that are likely to affect the process 
of recovery. Damage was extensive on the Mississippi Coast, and the area’s largest 
single source of employment – casino gambling – was knocked out of operation. In 
comparison to New Orleans, however, the number of people living in areas of 
moderate or greater damage was small, only about 50,000. And also in contrast to 
New Orleans, only a small share of these people were black and a majority were 
homeowners. It is difficult to assess the importance of race in recovery policy in 
Mississippi, but in a politically conservative state it could make a big difference that 
white homeowners constitute the bulk of claimants for state assistance. Further, 
these people are easier to serve for several reasons.  
1.  First, they are identifiable and – because they retain an ownership interest in 
their properties – they should prove easier for authorities to contact.  
2.  Second, since much of the damage wrought by Katrina in this area was by wind 
and rain damage, standard homeowner policies offer substantial private sector 
coverage of damage losses. For those with uninsured flood damage, Mississippi 
state government expects federal aid to be sufficient to fund payments of 
150,000 US Dollars  to individual homeowners. 
3.  Third, the low density of housing in this area means that typically even when 
one’s home was uninhabitable, there was space for a trailer in the driveway. 
Since in addition the loss of electrical power was relatively short-term in Missis-
sippi, and basic public services could be restored within a reasonable time, 
homeowners in this region more readily met the requirements for a FEMA-pro-
vided trailer – space and confirmed utility hookups.  
In contrast, consider the situation in New Orleans. Six months after Katrina, obser-
vers were beginning to see signs of progress (Russell 2006b). But more than half the 
persons in damaged areas were renters, unlikely to be protected in any way by pro-
perty insurance, and 30 per cent fell below the poverty line and were therefore 
unlikely to have their own funds to return to the city. By the end of 2005, power 
was still unavailable much of the city, and actual connections to electric power 
required residents to present evidence of inspection by a licensed electrician before 
power would be restored to an individual home. The utility company (a subsidiary 
of the Entergy Corporation) had filed for bankruptcy protection in September. 
Large areas of the city remain vacant even at the beginning of 2007. Though most 
debris has been removed and many homes have been gutted, reconstruction work 
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had not begun on most homes. Basic public services had not been restored in many 
neighborhoods. For example, only 54 public schools reopened in fall 2006 (com-
pared to 128 before Katrina). As shown in Figure 2, these schools were concen-
trated in high-ground neighborhoods close to the Mississippi River, with almost 
none in New Orleans East, the Lower Ninth Ward, Gentilly, and Lakeview. 
 
Figure 2: Location of public schools reopened in New Orleans for Fall 2006. 
 
Among the key policy choices confronted by the city, three stand out as especially 
significant (more generally see Popkin, Turner and Burt 2006; Nossiter 2006). These 
are the questions of how to allocate housing assistance funds to residents, how to 
restructure public housing, and where to concentrate support for neighborhood 
rebuilding. Initial steps favor people and neighborhoods that have more market 
resources and do little to support the most disadvantaged. 
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Housing assistance 
The principal public source of funding for housing reconstruction is the federal 
government, with 10.4 billion US Dollars in Community Development Block Grant 
support authorized in June 2006 for Louisiana (Maggi 2006). The state’s plan for 
using these funds is called The Road Home (Louisiana Office of Community 
Development 2006). It targets about 8 billion US Dollars for assistance to 
homeowners. Only 1.5 billion US Dollars is allocated to a program to redevelop 
rental housing.  
According to estimates by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Deve-
lopment (2006a) there were a total of almost 100,000 housing units in New Orleans 
that suffered »major or severe« damage or were destroyed. Of these 52 per cent 
were owner-occupied and 48 per cent occupied by renters. By this measure alone, 
the policy of allocating most funds to homeowners is not proportionate to the 
damage. Given that rents have risen by as much as 30–40 per cent and the vacancy 
rate for rental housing is near zero (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment 2006b), it seems clear that a more focused effort to build or rehabilitate 
rental housing would be needed in order to allow many rental households to return 
to the city. 
Public housing 
A special category of housing is public housing controlled by the Housing Authority 
of New Orleans. Prior to Katrina, there were about 8,000 units though due to poor 
maintenance (and consistent with a general plan of reducing this segment of the 
housing stock) only 5,100 were occupied at the time of Katrina. As was also true 
nationally, efforts were underway to restructure the system by demolishing existing 
units and replacing them with new mixed-income developments. This had already 
been done with one complex, the St. Thomas Project in the Central City/Garden 
District, which was demolished in 2002 and replaced by a Wal-Mart and new predo-
minantly market-rate condominiums. Originally built for 1,500 low-income families, 
the new development so far accommodates only 200. Most public housing com-
plexes were sealed after the hurricane (with metal barriers bolted over the door-
ways) to prevent tenants from returning. Confirming speculation during the pre-
ceding year, including comments by public officials that only »people who are 
willing to work« should be allowed to return to public housing, specific plans were 
announced in June 2006 by HUD Secretary Alphonso Jackson to demolish 5000 
more units (Saulny 2006). The St. Bernard, C. J. Peete, B. W. Cooper and Lafitte 
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housing developments would be entirely removed. They would be replaced by 
mixed-income developments following the St. Thomas model.  
At the same time, HUD increased by 35 per cent the amount that it would pay 
as the »fair market rent« through housing vouchers. If there were vacancies at this 
rate ($976 for a two-bedroom unit as of October 2006), a system of housing vouch-
ers for low and moderate income people could be evaluated as a reasonable alterna-
tive to public housing. But in the context of a zero-vacancy rental market at any 
price, the decision to press ahead with public housing demolition means that few 
displaced low-income families will have any opportunity to live in New Orleans in 
the future.  
Neighborhood triage 
Although public officials have assiduously avoided saying so, there is a high proba-
bility that redevelopment in some neighborhoods will be discouraged by public 
policy. If this is not done by an overt designation of areas as off-limits for building 
permits, the same outcome may be achieved passively by choosing not to make the 
public investments that are required for livable communities. These include repair 
of infrastructure damage and reopening of facilities such as schools and police and 
fire stations.  
The notion of neighborhood triage was implicit in the proposals made by the 
Bring Back New Orleans Commission (2006) in the public report of its Urban Plan-
ning Committee in January 2006. Some zones of the city were designated as »imme-
diate opportunity areas« where the city should identify vacant and underutilized pro-
perty for new construction, expedite permits for repairs and construction of new 
housing, provide/support community and cultural facilities and services, assist edu-
cational/health institutions to address immediate needs, and begin repair/recon-
struction using current rules and regulations. Others were proposed to be »neigh-
borhood planning areas,« where the city should conduct a neighborhood planning 
process to determine the appropriate future. In these areas, the city was advised not 
to issue any permits to build or rebuild.  
Although this report was not adopted, and indeed was widely criticized, it sets 
forth the key planning question: given that there are insufficient public resources to 
support fully the rebuilding of all neighborhoods, by what criteria should choices 
among neighborhoods be made? Mayor Nagin has repeatedly suggested one 
approach, to let the decisions be guided by residents who »vote with their feet« to 
return. Neighborhoods where a will to recover is demonstrated by individual invest-
ments and collective action should be supported; in other areas, individuals should 
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be counseled against trying to rebuild. This is essentially a proposal to let the market 
decide the future of the city.  
For many of the same reasons that rebuilding will be facilitated on the Missis-
sippi Coast, the white residents of the City of New Orleans are more likely than 
black residents to be able to return to their neighborhoods, even if the neighbor-
hood is reopened. Whites are more likely to be homeowners (55 per cent compared 
to 42 per cent among African American households), but more important, they are 
much more likely to have the personal resources to reinvest in their homes or to 
find a new residence in a difficult housing market. In the pre-Katrina black popula-
tion, 35 per cent were below the poverty line and the median household income 
was only 25,000 US Dollars. Among whites, only 11 per cent were poor and the 
median income was more than twice as high – 61,000 US Dollars. Therefore even 
among homeowners, blacks are less likely to have the means to rebuild than are 
whites. 
In conjunction with public support for homeowners over tenants and the plan 
to demolish most public housing, market-based policies point toward a future in 
which New Orleans – though it may be much smaller than before – will also have a 
smaller share of black residents, tenants, and poor and working class families. To 
the extent that the city’s labor force continues to require a certain share of persons 
with low skills and low wages, which is typical of a tourist economy, this means that 
these workers will mostly live elsewhere. 
The future in the balance: shifting electoral politics 
Although there appears to be an emerging direction in local recovery policy, final 
decisions have not been made. The provisions of Louisiana’s Road to Recovery and 
the demolition of public housing are being contested in court, and the election of 
Democratic majorities in the U.S. House and Senate may have some influence on 
how federal resources will be used. There is also a formal neighborhood planning 
process put in place in fall 2006, supported by a large grant from the Rockefeller 
Foundation, through which neighborhood organizations have been encouraged to 
make their voices heard. Another factor that may make a difference is the shifting 
constituencies in local politics. 
There has been a potential for political coalitions that cut across the racial and 
class divisions that have helped structure city politics over the decades. Residents of 
such very different neighborhoods as Lakeview and the Lower Ninth Ward have a 
shared interest in short-term assistance programs such as subsidies for temporary 
housing outside the city. Yet variations across neighborhoods – and across race and 
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class – are likely to support the emergence of a sense of conflicting interests. In 
December 2005 conflict took the form of opposition to proposals to locate FEMA 
trailers in public spaces within neighborhoods that sustained less damage. In this 
case the interests of advantaged neighborhoods (advantaged by protection from 
flooding and by having residents in place to express their views) were in conflict 
with the interests of absent residents who have no place to return. Not surprisingly 
the City Council gave its members veto power over new trailer parks in the areas 
that they represent.  
The mayoral election in spring 2006 offers evidence that conflicting interests are 
likely to overcome consensus (Logan 2006b), and it is not obvious whose interests 
will predominate. On the one hand, there was a substantial change in the composi-
tion of the electorate, reflecting the disproportionate displacement of lower income 
black voters. On the other, there was a surprising shift in the source of Mayor 
Nagin’s electoral support that could make him more responsive to that same cons-
tituency.  
The first indicator of change is turnout. In the previous municipal election 
(2002), when the current Mayor, Ray Nagin, defeated Richard Pennington, there 
was a modest turnout of 130,000 voters (out of a total pool of registered voters that 
has remained close to 300,000 for the last several years). In the more recent Presi-
dential election of 2004, when few local positions were at stake but there was consi-
derable interest in the contest between President George Bush and challenger John 
Kerry, the turnout was over 197,000. Compared to either standard, participation in 
2006 was depressed, with a total of under 115,000 votes cast. 
Of course a lower turnout was inevitable. More interesting is how turnout varied 
across neighborhoods. From the perspective of future urban policy, neighborhoods 
with the highest electoral participation have likely strengthened their hands in the 
battles over public investment and development plannings that are sure to be a 
major feature of local politics in the next several years. Figure 3 displays turnout 
levels in 2006 as a proportion of the 2002 level. This map can be compared to the 
map of racial composition and flood damage presented above.  
The neighborhoods with the largest declines in turnout are in the Lower Ninth 
Ward, New Orleans East, and parts of Mid-City and Bywater. These are all predo-
minantly black neighborhoods, but they have widely varying class composition. In 
Mid-City and Bywater it is especially the public housing projects whose former 
residents have been barred from returning to the city up to now. The Lower Ninth 
Ward is a mixed income area with many working class homeowners. These are both 
areas where the loss of public infrastructure and government restrictions on entry 
have seriously delayed recovery efforts. New Orleans East, in contrast, has been an 
important base for the black middle class. All these areas suffered close to 100 per 
cent flooding, and displacement is the most obvious explanation for low turnout.  
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Figure 3: Turnout in the mayoral primary election in New Orleans in 2006 in relation to turnout 
in 2002. 
 
Among white neighborhoods there is generally a positive correlation between voter 
turnout and extent of flood damage. For example, the Uptown/Carrollton and 
Central City/Garden District include some neighborhoods with very little flood 
damage and others that were hard hit. Neighborhoods with no flooding like Up-
town and Garden District had considerably higher participation than in 2002, while 
those with more damage like Broadmoor and Milan suffered a loss. But there are 
two other significant patterns to point out: 
1. Several planning districts show little impact of Katrina. The French Quarter 
and Central Business District actually had higher turnout than in 2002, as did New 
Aurora and Algiers on the West Bank. These are among the areas of the city with 
the least flood damage. The surprise here is how much participation declined in 
comparison to the 2004 Presidential election, with a fall of 25-30 per cent that 
seems unlikely to be due to population loss. In what may have been the most 
important election in the history of the city, why was turnout in these areas no more 
than the usual local standard? There may be evidence here of forces beyond dis-
 L O G A N :  U N N A T U R A L  D I S A S T E R  471  
 
placement, evidence of surprising apathy, alienation and disaffection from the 
political process by the residents of these relatively advantaged communities. 
2. On the other hand, despite its devastation Lakeview shows an exceptional 
turnout. The number of Lakeview voters was nearly (94 per cent) as high in 2006 as 
in 2002. Even more, there are only modest variations within the district between 
Lake Shore/Lake Vista, which was only partly flooded, and areas like Navarre that 
were heavily damaged. Lakeview’s participation may have been influenced by a 
special tax measure on the ballot that would increase property taxes in this district 
for the purpose of improved policing. A greater factor probably was extensive voter 
mobilization by local civic groups. Lakeview is known to have a strong civic 
association that has built upon the many smaller neighborhood associations that 
used to operate in the area, and in this election it translated its affluence and high 
levels of homeownership into political clout.  
Another planning district with a relatively high turnout despite considerable 
damage is Gentilly, especially the racially mixed neighborhoods of Fillmore (94 per 
cent as high as 2002) and Gentilly Terrace (88 per cent as high).  
Figure 4: Level of support for Ray Nagin in the mayoral election in New Orleans in 2002. 
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Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the shift with maps showing the extent of support for 
Nagin in his first race in 2002 and in the 2006 primary by precinct. Comparing these 
maps to the map of racial composition presented above, in 2002 it is clear that 
Nagin ran strongest in the neighborhoods with smaller black populations. Reports 
from the period suggested that in fact his election depended on support from white 
neighborhoods (and financial backing from people described as the »Uptown white 
establishment«). 
Although Hurricane Katrina reshaped the political map of the city by suppres-
sing the vote in the poorest and blackest neighborhoods, the dynamics of the mayo-
ral campaign also represent a more remarkable shift in the composition of support 
for the winning candidate, Mayor Ray Nagin. Having been elected in 2002 on the 
basis of his strong showing in white and more affluent neighborhoods, the Mayor 
was re-elected with his main edge among neighborhoods with predominantly black 
and low to middle income residents.  
Figure 5: Level of support for Ray Nagin in the mayoral primary election in New Orleans in 
2006. 
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In a surprising remaking of the electoral map, Nagin’s support in 2006 shifted 
almost 180 degrees – neighborhoods that had supported him now supported his 
opponents, and areas where he had found the least votes now constituted his core 
constituency. The planning districts with the highest levels of support for Mayor 
Nagin are the Lower Ninth Ward (83 per cent in 2006 compared to only 40 per cent 
in 2002) and New Orleans East (71 per cent, up from 55 per cent). The individual 
neighborhoods with the highest shares of Nagin votes are Project neighborhoods: 
above 90 per cent in Calliope Project, Desire Project, and Fischer Project, all areas 
where he previously received at most a third of votes. 
In contrast, Nagin lost heavily in predominantly white areas. In the Garden 
District, for example, which is only 2 per cent black, he had gained 85 per cent of 
the votes in 2002 but only 22 per cent in 2006. Lakeview, also 2 per cent black, 
voted overwhelmingly for Nagin in 2002 (87 per cent) but against him in 2006 (22 
per cent). 
The new political geography of the city certainly will be a factor as policy deci-
sions are made in the coming months and years. Where will schools reopen, where 
will policing and other public services be brought back on line soonest, where will 
rebuilding be encouraged by city officials and what neighborhoods will have a lower 
priority? Areas like the Lower Ninth Ward, New Orleans East, and the less affluent 
and predominantly black sections of Bywater and Mid-City have experienced sharp 
declines in their participation in the political process. In contrast, Lakeview nearly 
matched its 2002 vote total despite dislocation of most of its residents, and areas 
like Algiers, Uptown-Carrollton, the French Quarter, and Garden District see their 
political influence on the rise in this respect. 
But there is also a countervailing force, an unexpected consolidation of voting 
patterns along racial lines in which a politically conservative black mayor turned 
successfully to a black and low income constituency that previously had denied him 
their support. This outcome potentially diminishes the political losses that this part 
of the electorate, and the neighborhoods where they are concentrated, seemed sure 
to suffer. Much now depends on how well groups play their cards and what role the 
backroom players (the investors and real estate entrepreneurs who eventually once 
again supported Mayor Nagin’s campaign war chest) have in the process. Support 
from areas like the Projects, Lower Ninth Ward, and New Orleans East was critical, 
but their voices will have to be heard from a distance. White Republican neighbor-
hoods backed the losing candidate, but the 20 per cent or more of their votes that 
went to Nagin were indispensable to his victory. This is a situation where a public 
official will face conflicting pressures, but may also find considerable room to 
maneuver and provide leadership for a city that has put key decisions on hold for 
too long. 
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